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JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT
The jurisdiction of all appellate courts "shall be provided by statute."1 Section 78-2a3(2)(j) of the Utah Code, provides that the Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over
appeals transferred from the Supreme Court. This is an appeal from the final judgment of the
Fourth Judicial District Court regarding transferred by the Supreme Court to the Utah Court
of Appeals.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. Whether the trial court erred by taking jurisdiction over a dispute between a
Homeowner's Association and an individual homeowner where the governing CC&Rs
contained a mandatory arbitration provision?
Standard of Review:

Because the trial court based its decision on documentary

evidence and did not hold an evidentiary hearing on the disputed facts, the Utah Court of
Appeals should review the decision for correctness, according no particular deference to the
trial court's decision. Cade v. Zions First National Bank, 956 P.2d 1073, 1076 (Utah App.
1998)(trial court determined the parties had agreed to submit their disputes to arbitration,
basing this determination on documentary evidence without conducting an evidentiary hearing
on the disputed facts); see also Reed v. Davis County Sch. Dist., 892 P.2d 1063, 1064 (Utah
Ct.App. 1995) (stating that determination of whether valid arbitration agreement exists is a
question of law).

1

Utah Const., Article VIII, § 5.
1

2. Whether the mandatory arbitration provision was waived by Mr. Rich?
Standard of Review: Determining whether a party waived its contractual right to
arbitrate includes mixed questions of law and fact. See Cedar Surgery Ctr., L.L.C v. Bonelli,
96 P.3d 911, 913 (Utah 2004). In particular, "whether the trial court employed the proper
standard of waiver presents a legal question which is reviewed for correctness, but the actions
or events allegedly supporting waiver are factual in nature and should be reviewed as factual
determinations, to which we give a district court deference." Pledger v. Gillespie, 982 P.2d
572, 576 (Utah 1999).
3. Whether the trial court erred by setting aside the decision of the arbitration panel?
Standard of Review: The appellate court's "scope of review is limited to the legal
issue of whether the trial court correctly exercised its authority in confirming, vacating, or
modifying an arbitration award." Intermountain Power Agency v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 961
P.2d 320, 323 (Utah 1998).
4. Whether the trial court erred by proceeding with a temporary injunction hearing
under rule 65 A of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure without first deciding whether it had
personal jurisdiction over Mr. Rich?
Standard of Review: Because this pretrial jurisdictional decision was made on
documentary evidence only at the time of the temporary restraining order, it presents only
legal questions that are reviewed for correctness. See Starways, Inc. v. Curry, 980 P.2d 204
(Utah 1999). When a motion is based on a claim of lack of jurisdiction, the district court has
no discretion: if jurisdiction is lacking, the judgment cannot stand without denying due
2

process to the one against whom it runs. Therefore, the propriety of the jurisdictional
determination becomes a question of law upon which the appellate court does not defer to the
district court. State Dep't ofSoc. Servs. v. Vijil, 784 P.2d 1130, 1132 (Utah 1989) (citations
omitted).
5. Whether the trial court erred by finding there was an adequate summons when the
summons was defective on its face under Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure?
Standard of Review. Because this is a review of the trial court's interpretation of a
rule of civil procedure, the appellate court should review for correctness, giving no deference
to the trial court's conclusion. See Lyon v. Burton, 5 P.3d 616 (Utah 2000).
6. Whether the trial court erred by not requiring a bond before issuing a Temporary
Restraining Order under Rule 65 A of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure?
Standard of Review. Because this is a review of the trial court's interpretation of a
rule of civil procedure, the appellate court should review for correctness, giving no deference
to the trial court's conclusion. See Lyon v. Burton, 5 P.3d 616 (Utah 2000).
7. Whether the trial court erred by setting the matter for a four day jury trial at the pretrial conference and subsequently, upon the request of Plaintiffs, withdrawing the matter from
the province of a jury and converting the matter to a bench trial under Rule 39 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure one week before the trial started?
Standard of Review. Because this is a review of the trial court's interpretation of a
rule of civil procedure, the appellate court should review for correctness, giving no deference
to the trial court's conclusion. See Lyon v. Burton, 5 P.3d 616 (Utah 2000).
3

8. Whether the trial court erred by awarding attorneys fees against Mr. Rich pursuant
to a provision in the CC&Rs, which states, "members of the HO A shall not be liable to any
party for any action or for any failure to act with respect to any matter if the action taken or
failure to act was in good faith and without malice," when the Court found Mr. Rich acted in
good faith and without malice. CC&Rs f 7.3
Standard of Review. The trial court's interpretation of a contract presents a question
of law, which the court reviews for correctness. Nova Cas. Co. v. Able Constr., Inc., 983 P.2d
575 (Utah 1999).
Standard of Review. The court of appeals should review the trial court's decision
regarding attorney fees for an abuse of discretion. "The award of attorney fees is . . . in the
A

sound discretion of the trial court.'" Willey v. Willey,951 P.2d 226,230 (Utah 1997) {quoting

Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988)).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case:
The litigation involves a suit by a Homeowner's Association and certain individuals
who sued to stop the construction of an addition to Mr. Rich's home in the Thaynes Canyon
I Subdivision in Park City, Utah.

Mr. Rich filed a counterclaim against the HOA.
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Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below:
The litigation involves a suit by a Homeowner's Association and certain individuals
who sued to stop the construction of an addition to Mr. Rich's home in the Thaynes Canyon
I Subdivision in Park City, Utah. Mr. Rich resides in California and has asserted from the
commencement of the litigation that: (1) The Third District Court does not have jurisdiction
over the subject matter of this case because of a mandatory arbitration provision within the
Restrictive Covenants upon which the suit by the Homeowner's Association is based; and (2)
There has never been service of process over him and the Third District Court has not
acquired jurisdiction over him.

Despite these contentions, the Third District Court

disregarded the mandatory arbitration provision, set aside an arbitration award in Mr. Rich's
favor, and conducted prolonged proceedings that delayed the ultimate outcome of the case and
significantly increased the costs to both parties. The ultimate conclusion reached by the trial
court, after a bench trial, was in direct conflict with the decision reached by the arbitration
panel.
The Homeowner's Association and various individual homeowners filed suit for
breach of contract and injunctive relief. Mr. Rich had not answered the lawsuit, but appeared
specially and filed a Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Quash.
At the time of the hearing on the Temporary Restraining Order, Mr. Snuffer, counsel
for Mr. Rich, appeared to contest jurisdiction and not to address the merits of the Temporary
Restraining Order. The Third District Court did not reach a decision on whether it had
jurisdiction, nor on whether to grant the Motion to Quash, but issued a Temporary Restraining
5

Order stopping construction on the Rich residence in Thaynes Canyon I Subdivision. At the
time the Court entered the Order, Mr. Snuffer informed the Court he was not present to
address the subject of the Temporary Restraining Order, his engagement was limited to
contesting jurisdiction, and he could not accept service of any order upon the client. The
Court directed the Order be served upon Mr. Rich.
In addition to issuing a Temporary Restraining Order, the Court ordered the dispute
be submitted to arbitration under the provisions of the Restrictive Covenants, and the
arbitration take place before September 30th to avoid damages and delay to the construction
of Mr. Rich's home. No hearing on an amount of a bond was conducted, and no bond was
required by the Court, and no bond was posted at that time.
The Restrictive Covenants required three arbitrators to arbitrate the matter: One chosen
by the Homeowner's Association, one by Mr. Rich, and one chosen by the two arbitrators to
complete the panel. The Homeowner's Association chose Mr. Steven K. Gordon. Mr. Rich
chose Mr. David Slaughter. The two arbitrators then chose Mr. Kent B. Scott, who acted as
panel chair.
The Homeowner's Association and Mr. Rich then signed an agreement with the
arbitration panel to arbitrate the dispute. The letter stated, "I would like counsel for the
parties to confirm and acknowledge that by signing this letter that they have agreed to arbitrate
all issues arising under Case No. 050500428MI pending in the Third District Court for
Summit County and Assigned to Judge Bruce Lubeck." The signature below has this
language above counsel's signatures: "Counsel for the parties acknowledge and agree that the
6

above referenced matter may be arbitrated in accordance with the Uniform Revised
Arbitration Act and accept the arbitration panel as on the terms and as provided for in this
letter/5 Counsel for both parties signed.
After signing the agreement, counsel for both parties, as well as Mr. James Kenny the
first named individual plaintiff, president of the Homeowner's Association and himself an
attorney, participated in a scheduling conference with the Arbitration Panel by telephone.
During the conference a schedule was agreed to, discovery was agreed to take place, times
were set for discovery answers, for exchange of exhibits, for filing the prehearing briefs by
both parties and the payment of the fees. The date and time for the arbitration hearing was
also set. In the scheduling hearing counsel for Mr. Rich said that Mr. Rich did not object to
the authority or jurisdiction of the Arbitration Panel, but that he still contested the jurisdiction
of the Third District Court. There were pending motions to quash and dismiss which had not
been ruled upon at that time, and Mr. Rich did not want his submission to the arbitration to
be consent to the Court's general jurisdiction over him.
Pursuant to the agreement, the Homeowner's Association signed and returned the
arbitration agreement, paid the fees, answered discovery, submitted their prehearing exhibits
and prehearing brief. The day before the arbitration was to take place, the Homeowner's
Association filed an ex parte motion in the Third District Court asking that the arbitration be
canceled, and filed a motion before the Arbitration Panel asking them to cancel the arbitration.
The motion was granted by the Third District Court. The Arbitration Panel denied the motion.
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When the Third District Court granted the order canceling the Court ordered arbitration, a
copy of the order was delivered to the Arbitration Panel by the Homeowner's Association.
On the morning set for the arbitration to take place, the Arbitration Panel convened the
hearing and first addressed the question of whether to continue or cancel the arbitration. The
Arbitration Panel called counsel for the Homeowner's Association to discuss the matter.
Counsel for the Homeowner' s Association argued the Court had canceled the hearing and that
it could not proceed. The panel considered the arguments of the Homeowner's Association,
considered the Order of the Third District Court, and deliberated the matter. By a unanimous
decision of the panel, Mr. Scott, Mr. Slaughter and Mr. Gordon concluded the panel had
jurisdiction independent of the Third District Court, and that their authority was derived from
a written agreement to arbitrate, and the Court's decision did not affect the authority of the
Arbitration Panel. Therefore they determined to proceed. They informed the attorney for the
Homeowner's Association of that decision and invited him to appear, but he declined and said
neither he nor his clients would appear. Thereafter despite the absence of the Homeowner's
Association, the hearing proceeded. The Arbitration Panel considered the submissions of the
Homeowner's Association and their prehearing brief, documentary exhibits and arguments.
The Arbitration Panel issued a decision in favor of Mr. Rich.
The Third District Court then conducted a hearing under an Order to Show Cause, as
a result of which the Third District Court has set aside the decision of the Arbitration Panel
and ordered Mr. Rich to proceed to respond to a Preliminary Injunction hearing, without ever
having decided whether there has been adequate service. The Third District Court decided
8

it had jurisdiction, although Mr. Rich has only appeared specially. It also decided the
defective summons was valid, although finding the summons defective under Rule 12.
Defendant raised all issues of jurisdiction, service, defects in the summons and the propriety
of the arbitration matter being in the lower Court.
The decision of the Arbitration Panel should have been confirmed by the district court.
Alternatively the district court should have concluded there was no remaining dispute to
litigate. Instead, the district court proceeded to decide a matter which was moot. The district
court caused the parties to unnecessarily incur thousands of dollars in fees and costs, plus lose
valuable time because the district court refused to enforce the mandatory arbitration provision.
The district court held a bench trial on the limited issue
Facts established in the Record below:
1.

The Thaynes Canyon I HO A was created in 1971 and a Declaration of Protective
Covenants was recorded. R. 957.

2.

Mr. Rich owns Lot 73 in the Thaynes Canyon Subdivision, at the address of 57
Thaynes Canyon. Id.

3.

The Declaration states that "all buildings and structures on all Lots shall be setback at
least 10 feet from the side and rear lot lines. Sec. 6.4. R. 957-58.

4.

Mr. Rich was granted a building permit on August 10, 2005, by Park City Planning
Commission to build an addition to the residence on Lot 73. R. 958. The Park City
Municipal Code required a five foot setback from property lines at that time. Id.
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After being notified of the 10 foot setback provision, the licensed architect for Mr.
Rich (Mr. DeCarlo) changed the plans to twice "step back" the addition to that shown
on the plans submitted to the architectural committee. R. 959.
The architectural committee held a meeting on July 21,2005 regarding the addition to
Mr. Rich's residence. R. 960. No one ever told Mr. DeCarlo when or where the
meeting would be held. Id.
Neither Mr. Rich or Mr. DeCarlo had an opportunity to make a presentation at the July
21, 2005 meeting. R. 961.
At the July 21, 2005 meeting, the Architectural Committee decided to reject the plans
submitted by Mr. Rich. Id.
During or just after the meeting, Mr. Kenny called Mr. Rich and left a voice message
the plans were not approved. Id.
Mr. Rich did not receive the message until August as Mr. Rich was on vacation. Id.
On August 26, 2005, DeCarlo delivered a letter (Def. Ex. 4) to Kenney. R. 963. A
copy of the letter is attached hereto as Appendix 5.
The August 26, 2005 letter states, "John Rich would like this matter to be resolved
under 'Arbitration of Disputes" clause in the CCRs." See Appendix 5.
Mr. Rich, through Mr. DeCarlo, asked for arbitration on the basis of hardship, a permit
issued by Park City and the encroachment was minor. R. 963.

10

14.

A Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Jury Trial was filed on August
19,2005. R. 00001. A motion and memorandum for temporary restraining order were
also filed on August 19, 2005.

150

On September 16, 2005, Mr. Rich filed a Motion to Dismiss on the basis Section 8.3
of the Declaration required the dispute be submitted to arbitration. R.33-35.

16.

On September 16, 2005, Mr. Rich filed a Motion to Quash on the basis the summons
was defective and not properly served on Mr. Rich. R. 30-32.

17.

Without making any determination on the personal jurisdiction over Mr. Rich, the
Court entered a temporary restraining order against Mr. Rich on September 16, 2007.
R.45-48.

18.

The Court ordered the parties to arbitrate the dispute contemplated by Section 8.3 of
the Declaration of Protective Covenants for Thaynes Canyon Subdivision dated August
26, 1971, by September 30, 2005. R. 47.

19.

Under Section 8.3 of the Declaration, three arbitrators were required: one chosen by
the HO A, one by Mr. Rich, and one by the two arbitrators. R.00001, Ex. 1, pg. 13.

20.

The HOA chose Mr. Steven K. Gordon. R. 248, Ex. 1, pg. 3.

21.

Mr. Rich chose Mr. David Slaughter. Id.

22.

The two arbitrators then chose Mr. Kent B. Scott, who acted as the panel chair. Id.

23.

On or about September 23, 2005, the parties signed an arbitration agreement. R.89,
Ex. 2; R.248, Ex. l,pg. 3.

11

24.

By signing the arbitration agreement, the parties confirmed and acknowledged that
they agreed to arbitrate all issues arising under Case No. 050500428 MI pending in the
Third District Court for Summit County and assigned to Judge Bruce C. Lubeck. Id.

25.

Above the signature lines for the parties, the arbitration agreement states, "Counsel for
the parties acknowledge and agree that the above referenced matter may be arbitrated
in accordance with the Utah Revised Uniform Arbitration Act and accept the
arbitration panel as on the terms and as provided for in this letter." Id.

26.

The Panel and counsel for the HOA and Mr. Rich, as well as Mr. Kenny, participated
in a preliminary scheduling conference on September 23, 2005. Id. Neither counsel
for the HOA, nor Mr. Kenny, raised any objections to the Panel or the hearing. Id.
Counsel for Mr. Rich stated that he had reservations concerning the jurisdiction of the
Court.

Id. However, he stated that he had no reservations about the Panel's

jurisdiction or the matter being arbitrated. Id. Thus, he agreed to the arbitration
hearing. Id.
27.

At the preliminary scheduling conference, the Panel and counsel scheduled the
arbitration hearing for September 28, 2005. R.89, Ex. 2, ^ 4 pg. 3. The Panel and
counsel also discussed pre-hearing matters, including the parties' execution of the
Agreement, the rules applicable to the arbitration hearing, motions, discovery,
exchange of witness lists and exhibits, form of the award and pre-hearing briefs. Id.
A Preliminary Scheduling Conference and Order was entered and sent to counsel. Id.
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28.

On the afternoon before the hearing, Mr. Tesch requested cancellation of the
arbitration based upon the argument that Mr. Rich had "objected to the jurisdiction of
the panel." Id. at ^f 7. This was not true. Id. The Panel never received any objection
to its jurisdiction from Mr. Rich or his counsel. Id. Mr. Tesch did not request a
hearing.

30.

Mr. Tesch obtained an ex parte order from the district court that purported to cancel
the "court-ordered" mediation. Id. at^f 8. There was no indication in the Court's order
that the Court had been informed that the parties had signed the agreement, which
conferred jurisdiction on the Panel independent of any prior court order. Id.

31.

On September 27, 2005, the Panel emailed a letter to Mr. Tesch and Mr. Snuffer
acknowledging receipt of Judge Lubeck's Order canceling the arbitration proceeding.
R. 301, Ex. I, Ex. 8.

32.

The Panel determined the arbitration should proceed and that counsel should be heard
on the HOA's request that the Panel cancel the arbitration hearing. Id.; R.89, Ex. 2,
If 10..

32.

The Panel unanimously decided that although the arbitration was initially ordered by
the Court, it ceased to be Court-ordered when the parties executed the Agreement, in
which they consented in writing to the arbitration of all issues in the underlying case,
consented to use the arbitrators that had been appointed, and participated in a
preliminary scheduling conference relating to the governance of the arbitration
process. Id. at ^f 13.
13

33.

The arbitration proceeded not pursuant to the Court's order, but rather pursuant to the
agreement consistent with paragraph 8.3 of the CC&Rs, which granted jurisdiction to
the Panel independent of any court order. Id. at f 14.

34.

The Panel concluded that Mr. Rich was entitled to a variance of paragraph 6.4 of the
CC&Rs and awarded Mr. Rich attorney's fees and costs. Id. at ^ 3.

3 5.

Pursuant to the Interim Arbitration Award, Mr. Snuffer submitted fees and costs in the
amount of $7,050.25.

36.

The district court entered a ruling and order on October 6, 2005, vacating the
arbitration award. R.235.

37.

The arbitration panel reviewed the ruling and order of the district court. The panel
unanimously concluded the arbitration was conducted in accordance with controlling
authority. R. 301, Ex. I, Ex. 4.

38.

Mr. Rich did not act with malice or in bad faith during the litigation. R. 1068.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The arbitration agreement in the CC&Rs was controlling. Mr. Rich did not

waive the arbitration provision under Utah law. The district court did not have the authority
to vacate the arbitration award, especially for the reason that Mr. Rich reserved his right in
the arbitration proceeding to contest jurisdiction pursuant to his pending motion to dismiss
and motion to quash.
2.

The parties agreed to arbitrate the dispute, signed the arbitration agreement and

submitted arbitration briefs to the panel. The parties and their counsel participated in a
14

scheduling conference for the arbitration and submitted to the jurisdiction of the panel. The
panel was independently authorized by the arbitration agreements signed by the parties to
arbitrate the dispute. The district court did not have the authority to vacate the arbitration
award.
3.

The court could not enter a temporary restraining order without first addressing

the personal jurisdiction objection raised by Mr. Rich. Jurisdiction is a fundamental
requirement before a court has authority to take any action against a party.
4. The summons allegedly served on Mr. Rich was defective because it required an
answer within twenty days instead of the thirty day period required in Rule 4 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure for out of state residents.
5. The district court failed to require security under Rule 65 A of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
6. The district court erroneously took the trial of this matter away from the jury and
restricted the trial to the issue of abandonment.
7. The district court's award of attorney's fees violated Section 7.3 of the Declaration.

ARGUMENT
I.

The Arbitration Provision in the CC&Rs was Controlling

Section 8.3 of the Declaration of Protective Covenants for Thaynes Canyon
Subdividision (hereinafter "CC&Rs") requires the arbitration of all controversies arising
under or with respect to the CC&Rs. Defendant Rich properly notified the Thaynes Canyon
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Homeowner's Association ("HOA") of his desire to arbitrate the dispute. Utah courts have
recognized that arbitration has much to recommend it. See Buckner v. Kennard, 99 P.3d 842
(Utah 2004).
A. No Waiver of Arbitration
Under Utah law, courts "interpret contracts in favor of arbitration," Central Florida
Investments, Inc. v. Parkwest, 40 P.3d 599, 606 (Utah 2002). The district court erroneously
concluded for two reasons that Mr. Rich waived his right to arbitrate the dispute. R. 202-204.
First, the district court concluded the demand for arbitration must be by certified mail or
registered mail as required by Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 la-110. R. 202. Because Mr. DeCarlo
hand-delivered the arbitration demand, the district court found the demand was not valid. R.
202-203. However, the statute only requires notice via certified mail in the absence of
agreement. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 la-110(1). Section 8.3 of the Declaration provides
that any party desiring to arbitrate any controversy shall file written notice of his desire with
the Association within 30 days after he discovers, learns or has notice of such determination,
decision or action. R.00001, Ex. 1. The notification hand-delivered by DeCarlo met the
requirements in Section 8.3 of the Declaration.
The second reason for finding waiver was the arbitration demand was untimely. The
district court found Mr. Rich did not receive the telephone message from Mr. Kenny until
August, after Mr. Rich returned from his vacation. R.961. On August 26,2005, Mr. DeCarlo
delivered the arbitration demand to Mr. Kenny. The demand was received within 30 days of
when Mr. Rich received notice of the decision by the architectural committee not to accept
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his plans, which was sometime in August when he returned from vacation. The letter clearly
sets forth the reasons for the arbitration request. See Appendix 5. Therefore, the demand is
within the time required by Section 8.3 in the Declaration. The district court's conclusion Mr.
Rich "knew of the decision of the Association Trustees July 21, 2005 is contradicted by the
district court's specific finding Mr. Rich did not receive the voice message from Mr. Kenny
until August, when Mr. Rich returned from his vacation.
Even if the HOA argues Mr. Rich received notice when the committee contacted Mr.
DeCarlo, this still does not constitute waiver under Utah law. In Utah the law favors
arbitration and as such, there is a strong presumption against finding that a party waived its
right to arbitration. See Baker v. Stevens, 114 P.3d 580 (Utah 2002); Central Fla. Invs.f Inc.
v. ParkwestAssocs^ 40 P.3d 599 (Utah 2002). Consistent with general waiver jurisprudence,
see Soter 's v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass % 857 P.2d 935, 939-40 (Utah 1993)(defming
waiver as the "intentional relinquishment of a known right"(quotation omitted)), Utah courts
have held that a "waiver of the right to arbitrate must be intentional," and a court may infer
waiver only if the facts demonstrate that the party seeking to enforce arbitration intended to
disregard its right to arbitrate. Cent. Fla., 40 P.3d at 608. To determine whether a party
waived its right to arbitrate, the court must look to whether the party substantially participated
in litigation to a point inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate, and if so, whether that
participation resulted in prejudice to the opposing party. Id. The HOA has the burden of
establishing substantial participation and prejudice. Id.
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Mr. Rich did not willingly participate in the underlying litigation, but fought the far
reaching rulings of the district court every step of the way. First, Mr. Rich filed a motion to
dismiss based on the arbitration agreement. Secondly, Mr. Rich filed a motion to quash the
summons and complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. Mr. Rich willingly accepted the
jurisdiction of the Arbitration panel, while contesting the jurisdiction of the district court. Mr.
Rich participated in the arbitration process, attended the scheduling conference for the
arbitration proceeding via his counsel, and had his counsel attend the actual arbitration
proceeding. Mr. Rich filed an arbitration brief and served discovery on the HOA in
preparation of the arbitration proceeding. All of these activities demonstrated that Mr. Rich
was protecting his right to arbitrate the dispute and resisting any attempts to litigate the case.
When Mr. Richfiledhis answer to the complaint, Mr. Rich raised arbitration as an affirmative
defense. R. 454. The decision by the district court that Mr. Rich waived his right to arbitrate
the case is not supported in the record and should be reversed.
B. Arbitration Panel Interim Award Binding Upon the Parties
The decision of the Arbitration Panel was binding upon the parties. It is well
established that the decision as to whether the arbitration of a dispute is to be set aside only
under the Arbitration Act itself. See, e.g., Alfred v. Educators Mut. Ins. Ass 'n., 909 P.2d 1263
(Utah 1996). The controlling law of Utah is that:
The Act supports arbitration of both present and future disputes and reflects
long-standing public policy favoring speedy and inexpensive methods of
adjudicating disputes. Giannopulos v. Pappas, 80 Utah 442,449,15 P.2d 353,
356 (1932). Given the public policy and law in support of arbitration, judicial
review of arbitration awards confirmed pursuant to the Act is limited to those
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grounds and procedures provided for under the Act. Robinson & Wells, P.C.
v. Warren, 669 P.2d 844, 846 (Utah 1983). In Utility Trailer Sales of Salt
Lake, Inc. v. Fake, 740 P.2d 1327,1329 (Utah 1987), we discussed the correct
standard of review as follows:
In order to serve that policy and achieve its objective, judicial
review of arbitration awards should not be pervasive in scope or
susceptible to repetitive adjudications, but should be limited to
the statutory grounds and procedures for review. As a general
rule, awards will not be disturbed on account of irregularities or
informalities, or because the court does not agree with the
award, so long as the proceeding has been fair and honest and
the substantial rights of the parties have been respected.
(Citing Robinson, 669 P.2d at 846.)
The Utah Arbitration Act, 78-31 a-1, et. seq. makes vacating an arbitration proceeding
limited to the following enumerated bases:
...the court shall vacate an award made in the arbitration proceeding if:
a) the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means;
b) there was:
i)evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral arbitrator;
ii) corruption by an arbitrator; or
iii) misconduct by an arbitrator prejudicing the rights of a party to the
arbitration proceeding;
c) an arbitrator refused to postpone the hearing upon showing of sufficient
cause for postponement, refused to consider evidence material to the
controversy, or otherwise conducted the hearing contrary to Section 78-3 la116, so as to substantially prejudice the rights of a party to the arbitration
proceeding;
d) an arbitrator exceeded the arbitrator's authority;
e) there was no agreement to arbitrate, unless the person participated in the
arbitration proceeding without raising an objection under Subsection 78-3 la116(3) not later than the beginning of the arbitration hearing; or
f) the arbitration was conducted without proper notice of the initiation of an
arbitration as required in Section 78-3 la-110 so as to substantially prejudice
the rights of a party to the arbitration proceeding.
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None of these apply. Further, the decision of the Third District Court was not based
upon any of these reasons. There was no allegation nor any basis for setting aside the
Arbitration Panel's decision based upon "corruption, fraud, or other undue means." There
was no allegation of an arbitrator or the panel being less than impartial or even any hint they
engaged in misconduct in conducting the proceedings which resulted in prejudice. There was
nothing improper in the Arbitration Panel's decision to not postpone the hearing. Indeed, the
Arbitration Panel weighed the request to continue the hearing, heard argument, considered
the Third District Court's decision to lift the Court's order to arbitrate, and informed both
parties in writing and orally that they determined to proceed.
There was nothing in the notice or scheduling which was inappropriate. Indeed, the
schedule was set with the agreement of both parties. The Homeowner's Association met the
deadlines for discovery and for submission of the pre-hearing brief and exchange of exhibits.
The scheduling dispute does not exist. What exists is a false contention of the Homeowner's
Association which the Third District Court accepted that Mr. Rich did not intend to be bound
by the arbitration result. Both the Homeowner's Association and the Third District Court
should have known better because:
1. It was Mr. Rich who contended at the outset that this entire matter required
arbitration and could not be the subject of a Court proceeding. See, e.g., Mr. Rich's Motion
to Dismiss, R. 26-36.
2. It was Mr. Rich who requested in writing that the arbitration be conducted. Id.
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3. When the scheduling hearing before the Arbitration Panel was conducted, the
Panel asked whether Mr. Rich intended to be bound by the results of the arbitration. He
responded "that he had no reservations about the Panel's jurisdiction or the mater being
arbitrated. Thus, he agreed to the arbitration hearing." R. 89, Ex. 2; R.248, Ex. 1, pg. 3.
4. Mr. Rich stated through counsel at the hearing on September 16th, and again in the
hearing on October 6th, that he intended to be bound by the arbitration.
Thus, when the Homeowner's Association filed a motion with the Court stating that
Mr. Rich did not intend to be bound by the outcome of the arbitration, the Homeowner's
Association knew that to be contrary to the repeated declarations of Mr. Rich. The Third
District Court adopted the Homeowner's Association's accusations and have echoed them
in the Ruling and Order being appealed. The Third District Court stated: "defendant was
attempting to seek arbitration but attempting to avoid it if it was unfavorable to him.'" R. 199.
The Homeowner's Association had been present in the discussion before the Arbitration
Panel when Mr. Rich stated "that he had no reservations about the Panel's jurisdiction or the
mater being arbitrated. Thus, he agreed to the arbitration hearing." R. 89, Ex. 2, ^f 4 pg. 3.
Thus, although the Homeowner' s Association has raised this argument, and the Third District
Court has adopted it as a fact, it was erroneous and known to the Homeowner's Association
to be erroneous when they made the application to the Third District Court to vacate the order
to arbitrate.
The Arbitration Panel had all this before it. They also had the Third District Court's
Order vacating the arbitration before them. They had participated in the scheduling
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conference and were aware of Mr. Rich's answer "that he had no reservations about the
Panel' s jurisdiction or the mater being arbitrated. Thus, he agreed to the arbitration hearing."
R. 89, Ex. 2, ^[ 4 pg. 3. Therefore, the Arbitration Panel concluded that the arbitration would
be binding upon Mr. Rich, and that Mr. Rich had consented to the arbitration.
The agreement to arbitrate, accepted by both parties, provides that the parties "agree
to arbitrate all issues arising under Case No. 050500428MI pending in the Third District
Court for Summit County and assigned to Judge Bruce C. Lubek." R. 89, Ex. 2, ^ 3 pg. 3.
The Third District Court's Order did not require the parties to sign any agreement to
arbitrate. It simply directed that arbitration take place. The parties on their own agreed to
the written arbitration terms. The parties agreed that they would not merely arbitrate the
question of the Homeowner's Association's complaint about the home addition going
partially into the ten foot setback, but also to arbitrate "all issues arising under Case No.
050500428MI pending in the Third District Courtfor Summit County and assigned to Judge
Bruce C Lubek'' R. 89, Ex. 2, ^f 4 pg. 3. Thus the agreement, entered into after a dispute
had arisen, takes the entire dispute out of Judge Lubeck's hands and puts it before the
Arbitration Panel.
When arbitration is selected, as here, it is governed by the Utah Uniform Arbitration
Act. Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-3la-101 to -131 (2003). The Utah legislature promotes
alternative dispute resolution, including arbitration, because it Mreduce[s] the need for judicial
resources and the time and expense of the parties." Id. § 78-3 lb-3(2)(c). Arbitration is meant
to offer an alternative or supplement to the formal processes associated with a court trial and
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to promote the efficient and effective operation of the courts of this state by authorizing and
encouraging the use of alternative methods of dispute resolution to secure the just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of civil actions filed in the courts of this state. Id. § 78-3 lb3(1). Utah courts have also recognized the strong public policy favoring arbitration Mas an
approved, practical, and inexpensive means of settling disputes and easing court congestion."
Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Utah, 833 P.2d 356, 358 (Utah 1992). Arbitration
proceedings benefit the parties by providing "a method more expeditious and less expensive
[than the court system] for the resolution of disputes." Docutel Olivetti Corp. v. Dick Brady
Sys., Inc., 731 P.2d 475,479 (Utah 1986) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also
Giannopulos v. Pappas, 15 P.2d 353, 356 (Utah 1932) ("[Arbitration is favored in the law
as a speedy and inexpensive method of adjudicating differences."). The use of arbitration as
an alternative to traditional judicial proceedings should therefore be encouraged. Pac. Dev.,
L.C. v. Orton, 23 P.3d 1035 (Utah 2001).
Arbitration is "a matter of contract." Cent. Fla. Invs., Inc. v. ParkwestAssocs., 40 P.3d
599 (Utah 2002). The parties to the arbitration determine the scope and questions to be
resolved during the proceedings and the arbitrator must not exceed the scope defined in the
parties1 written agreement. Intermountain Power Agency v. Union Pac. R.R., 961 P.2d 320,
323 (Utah 1998). Moreover, arbitration contracts are to be enforced according to their terms,
and arbitration proceedings shall be conducted in the manner to which the parties have
agreed. Docutel Olivetti, 731 P.2d at 480.
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The Third District Court has erred in vacating the arbitration award. The travesty of
this error is evident in the attorney's fees and costs requested by Mr. Rich after entry of the
arbitration award ($7,050.25) and the attorney's fees and costs requested by the HOA after
the trial ($119,539).
II. The District Court Did Not Have Personal Jurisdiction Over Defendant
The Third District Court erred by proceeding to enter a temporary restraining order
without first deciding whether it had jurisdiction over Mr. Rich. The question ofjurisdiction
is threshold to further proceedings. Yet Mr. Rich was left in limbo from the onset of this
case as to whether or not there was jurisdiction over him even being asserted by the Third
District Court. "A threshold issue is whether or not this court has jurisdiction to hear [the
matter]. If a court lacks jurisdiction 'it has not power to entertain the suit.' Curtis v. Curtis,
789 P.2d 717, 726 (Utah App. 1990) (citations omitted). Not only can a court not entertain
the suit, the parties cannot cure the jurisdictional defect by waiver or consent." Crump v.
Crump, 821 P.2d 1172, 1173 (Utah App. 1991). Thus, from the hearing on September 16,
2005, to the October 6,2005 time frame, Mr. Rich was left not knowing whether or not there
was any jurisdiction over him being asserted by the Third District Court. Given the contract
of the parties in which they "agree to arbitrate all issues arising under Case No.
050500428MI pending in the Third District Court for Summit County and assigned to Judge
Bruce C. Lubeck,"

it would appear that while the jurisdictional question remained

unresolved by the Court, the parties agreed to remove the jurisdiction from the Third District
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Court and place it exclusively in their Arbitration Panel. Accordingly, the Third District
Court was without jurisdiction to proceed further in Case No. 050500428.
III. The Summons Was Defective
The Summons was never served on Mr. Rich, was defective and should have been
quashed. The affidavits of Mr. Rich (R. 248 Ex. 1, Ex. 10) and his daughter (R. 248, Ex. 1,
Ex. 11) both state that no "woman" resides at the home of Mr. Rich (a widower whose wife
died of cancer ten years ago and who has not remarried and does not cohabitate with another
person). Someone left a copy of the summons on Mr. Rich's porch in California on one
occasion and a copy in his mailbox on another occasion. Both of those were retrieved by his
son. Mr. Rich did not received service.
Further, the summons was directed at an out-of-state defendant. It allowed only
twenty (20) days to respond. It should have required thirty (30), as the Third District Court
notes in its decision.

R. 194.

Despite this defect the Court concluded that "the

misinformation conveyed in the summons does not go to the heart of the basis for service"
and therefore decides it will be waived by the Court. R. 194. This was error.
This action should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because of the
defective summons based on Martin v. Nelson, 533 P.2d 897 (Utah 1975). In Martin the
process was defective because the summons stated that an answer was required to be filed
in twenty days instead of the thirty days required in the rules. Id. The Utah Supreme Court
held that the defects in the summons made the process invalid and that the defects were
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jurisdictional. Id. The lower Court's decision that it has jurisdiction was an error and to
continue the proceedings in the face of that error compounds the error.
The omission of the mandatory statements required by Rule 4 renders a summons
"fatally defective." Sticking Mayflower v. Jordanelle, 47 P.3d 86, 89 (Ut. Ct. App. 2001);
Wasatch Livestock Loan Co., 46 P.2d at 399 (interpreting earlier procedural statute that
mirrors Rule 4(c)(1)); see also Locke v. Peterson, 285 P.2d 1111, 1113 (1955); Farmer's
Banking Co. v. Bullen, 111 P. 969, 971 (Utah 1923). Therefore, the Court has no authority
to merely waive the mandatory statements set forth in Rule 4 (such as out of state defendants
have thirty days to respond to the complaint). Before the requirement to endorse and date
the time of service was omitted from the rules, the Utah Supreme Court held that failure of
a process server to indorse the date and time of service on the summons is "fatally defective
when the defendant appears timely and specially to quash the service." Dynapac, Inc. v.
Innovations, Inc., 550 P.2d 191, 192 (Utah 1976). Such reasoning should still apply to a
defective summons which all admit had the wrong time frame for answering on it. The
Court's reasoning that "the misinformation conveyed in the summons does not go to the heart
of the basis for service" is clearly erroneous. (Exhibit 1, page 18.) Misinformation and
misdirection to the defendant in a document which misstates his obligation to answer does
go to the heart of the basis of service. The lower Court is overruling the Rules of Civil
Procedure and the Utah Supreme Court and saying that due process in Utah no longer
requires compliance with the law or accurate notice to a foreign defendant being hailed into
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Court here. Certainly Utah would not want a similar rule adopted by sister states and used
against its residents. And so here we should not permit such a rule to be created.
IV, Lack of bond.
In the rush of ex parte proceedings below, the Third District Court erred by not
requiring a bond before issuing a Temporary Restraining Order. While it is true that you can
issue a Temporary Restraining Order without requiring a bond (see, e.g., Corp. President of
the Church ofJesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Wallace, 787 P.2d 508 (Utah App. 1990),
the decision of whether there is a bond required turns on an inquiry into whether there will
be harm to the defendant if such an order is issued. (See, e.g., Hutchins v. Trombley, 509
P.2d 579 (Idaho 1973)). Rule 65A mandates security: "The court shall condition issuance
of the order or injunction on the giving of security by the applicant." (Emphasis added.) The
Third District Court, in its haste to issue the Temporary Restraining Order below, did not
require security. This despite the fact that the order would interrupt construction, which
cannot occur in late September in Park City without inflicting winter construction conditions
upon the project. Indeed, the lower Court ordered the quick arbitration because of the
admittedly expensive effects of such an order upon the construction.

However, the

Temporary Restraining Order was then prepared, submitted to the Court and signed before
counsel for Mr. Rich had any opportunity to give input. Later, when the defect was pointed
out to the Court, the Court did not make any findings that there was no damage, but rather
added language to its Ruling and Order after the fact faulting Mr. Rich for the failure to get
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security (thereby shifting the responsibility for the defect from the applicant who had the duty
under Rule 65 A to the defendant). The Court's reasoning went on to explain it would be the
Homeowner's Association who "even if the TRO is wrongly issued, would be responsible
for any damages occasioned by the wrongful issuance of the TRO."
V. The Court Erred by Striking the Jury On the Eve of Trial
The HOA originally demanded a jury trial without limiting their demand to any
particular claims. R.00007. The HOA paid the jury fee and never expressed any desire to
withdraw their request for a jury trial. The complaint included a claim for breach of contract,
as well as claims for injunctive and declaratory relief, thus clearly entitling plaintiffs to a jury
trial. R. 921. On the eve of trial, just 13 days before trial was to commence, the HOA
withdrew their claims for breach of contract and declaratory relief. R. 802. Therefore, the
HOA asked the Court to strike the jury trial and simultaneously objected to trial by jury. R.
802. The district court noted the Mr. Rich never consented to the request to withdraw the
jury demand and therefore striking the jury was not possible under Rule 38(d). R.000920,
R929. However, the Court eliminated the jury under Rule 39 just one week before the jury
trial was scheduled to begin. Id.
The district court believed the issue was whether Mr. Rich was entitled to a jury trial
on abandonment. R.929. The court acknowledged that Mr. Rich was "clearly" entitled to
a jury trial on issues such as bad faith, liability of the trustees, damages and so forth. Id.
However, the court reasoned that since the HOA was not entitled to a jury trial on whether
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a permanent injunction should issue, then Mr. Rich was not entitled to a jury trial unless Mr.
Rich had a right to a jury trial to defeat a claim for injunction. R. 930.
The court acknowledged that there was a factual and legal dispute about whether a
setback provision had been abandoned. The court determined the first issue to be addressed
under abandonment was the number and nature of the violations. R. 933. The court admitted
this analysis was "mostly, however, a factual determination a jury could make." Id. The
court acknowledged the next question under abandonment, other instances of enforcement,
was also largely a factual question. Id. The final element of abandonment, whether their
remains any benefit to enforcement, was viewed as purely a legal determination by the court.
Id.

Despite finding that a jury could certainly make findings as to some of the factual

aspects of abandonment, including the number of violations and any prior acts of
enforcement, the court determined the matter was purely an equitable matter and must be
decided by the court. R.936.
As numerous Utah courts have indicated, the right of trial by jury is one which should
be carefully safeguarded by the courts, and when a party had demanded such a trial, he is
entitled to have the benefit of the jury's findings on issues of fact. It is not the trial court's
prerogative to disregard or nullify them by making findings of his own. First Sec. Bank v.
Ezra C Lundahl, Inc., 454 P.2d 886 (1969); Schow v. Guardtone, Inc., 417 P.2d 643 (1966);
See statements in Flynn v. W.P. Harlin Const. Co., 509 P.2d 356 (1973); Roche v. Zee, 264
P.2d 855 (1953); Uptown Appliance & Radio Co. v. Flint, 249 P.2d 826 (1952).
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Mr. Rich rightfully relied upon Plaintiffs' demand for a jury trial from the start of this
case. Plaintiffs demanded a jury trial, without any limitation on the demand, and Mr. Rich
therefore prepared the case for a jury trial. Both parties exchanged the actual exhibits for the
jury trial and submitted witness lists for the four day jury trial. Until Plaintiffs dropped their
breach of contract claims and declaratory judgment claims on the eve of trial in a transparent
effort to limit their claims to non-jury equitable claims, the parties in this case had consented
to a jury verdict on all issues, legal and equitable, under Rule of Civil Procedure 39(c) and
Utah Code Ann. § 78-21-2. Although express consent is not necessary, see Goldberg v. Jay
Timmons & Assoc, 896 P.2d 1241, 1243 (Utah App. 1995)(citation omitted), the parties
expressly consented to trial by jury of all legal and equitable claims. Therefore, the district
court should have denied the Plaintiffs' request to withdraw their jury demand and present
both the legal and equitable issues in this proceeding to the jury. By taking the issues away
from the jury just seven days before trial, the court caused serious prejudice to Defendant
Rich who had relied upon Plaintiff s jury demand and prepared this case for a civil jury trial.
Federal courts have concluded considerations of fairness to the litigants indicate that
Rule 39(c) should not be interpreted to allow a judge to rule a jury verdict advisory after the
parties have begun to implement their trial plan. Id. at 1243 (citations omitted). Any good
trial lawyer will acknowledge there are significant tactical differences in presenting and
arguing a case to a jury as opposed to a judge. Id.
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The district court's decision to first decide the equitable claims and then empanel the
jury and determine any legal issues if necessary, directly contradicts the holding in Zions
Bankv, Rocky Mtn. Irr., 795 P.2d 658, 662 (Utah 1990). In Zions, the Utah Supreme Court
noted:
The distinction between issues triable at law and those triable in equity serves
to delineate the scope of the right to a jury trial under our case law. In
International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Pioneer Tractor & Implement, Inc.,
626 P.2d 418 (Utah 1981), we held that article I, section 10 of the Utah
Constitution guarantees the right to a jury trial in civil cases. In Hyatt v. Hill,
714 P.2d 299 (Utah 1986), we made it clear that this constitutional right to a
jury trial in civil cases extends only to cases that would have been cognizable
at law at the time the constitution was adopted. Rocky Mountain was the first
of the parties to bring suit. Because of the later realignment of the various
actions by the court, Rocky Mountain's claims were transformed into
affirmative defenses and counterclaims. This realignment could not have
changed, and did not change, the nature of any issue from legal to equitable.
Rocky Mountain should have been afforded its right to a jury trial on the issue
of whether the two notes creating the line of credit were materially and
fraudulently altered. Such a claim raised by a plaintiff at the time our
constitution was adopted would have been triable to a jury. See, e.g., Petty v.
Clark, 129 P.2d 568, 569-70 (1942). The facts that the claim also constituted
an affirmative defense to a foreclosure and that foreclosures were tried in
equity at the time the constitution was adopted do not change the issue from
legal to equitable. In International Harvester, we noted that our analysis was
in harmony with that of the United States Supreme Court on the issue of the
right to a jury trial in civil cases when equitable issues are also involved.
International Harvester, 626 P.2d at 421 n. 2. In the federal courts, there is no
question that when legal and equitable issues turn on the same operative facts,
a jury must decide the legal issue first; the jury's factual determination binds
the trial court in its determination of the parallel equitable issue. See, e.g., Lytic
v. Household Manufacturing, Inc.,
U.S.
, 110 S.Ct. 1331,108 L.Ed.2d
504 (1990); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 79 S.Ct. 948, 3
L.Ed.2d 988 (1959), cited with approval in International Harvester; see
generally C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §§ 2305,
2306, 2338 (1971). We approve of this procedure.
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Accordingly, when the right to a jury trial exists with respect to any claim, it cannot
be vitiated by bifurcating and first trying to the court an equitable claim predicated upon
common facts. Goldberg, 896 P.2d at 1243. Rather, the jury issues are tried to the jury first,
and the Court is bound by the jury's findings in any subsequent decision on equitable issues.
Therefore, the district court's determination to hear the equitable claim regarding injunctive
relief served to vitiate the legal claim for declaratory relief filed by Defendant Rich which
goes to the authority and existence of the HO A to deny the addition, the lack of enforcement
of the CC&Rs in the HOA, and the lack of any proper or valid voting procedures of the
HOA.
Plaintiffs claim for injunctive relief that the addition by Defendant Rich violated the
side yard setback requirements was based upon the common set of facts upon which Mr.
Rich's claims were based. Specifically, Mr. Rich claimed the preliminary injunction granted
by the Court was wrongfully issued and Mr. Rich was entitled to delay damages resulting
from the injunction. The same nucleus of common facts should have been decided by the
jury to determine if the injunction was properly granted. To determine whether the injunction
was properly granted, the jury should have determined the disputed facts in this proceeding,
namely, to what extent, if any, did the the addition to the Rich residence encroach on the side
yard setback. The jury should have decided whether the encroachment, if any, was material
or substantially complied with the CC&Rs.

The jury should have determined whether the

HOA and the individual parties acted in good faith and without malice as required in Section
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7.3 of the CC&Rs. In addition, the jury should have determined if Mr. Rich acted in good
faith and without malice and is therefore entitled to the limitation of liability set forth in
Section 7.3 of the CC&Rs. These are all factual issues which should have been decided by
the trier of fact In this case, it required a decision by the jury. The district court noted these
decisions were "certainly triable to a jury," but determined that the equitable defense of
abandonment should be tried before the non-equitable claims presented by Mr. Rich. This
sequencing violates the decision set forth by the Utah Supreme Court announced in Zions
Bank above.

VIL Trial Court Erred by Awarding Attorney's Fees to Plaintiffs
A party requesting an award of attorney fees has the burden of presenting evidence
sufficient to support the award. Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890, 893 (Utah 1996).
Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proving attorney's fees in this matter. The district
court awarded attorney fees to Plaintiffs pursuant to the Declaration. R. 991. Mr. Rich
objected to the award of attorney's fees on several grounds. R. 1003-12. First, section 7.3
of the Declaration states that no member of the HOA "shall be liable to any party for any
action or for any failure to act with respect to any matter if the action taken or the failure to
act was in good faith and without actual malice." As a member of the HOA, Mr. Rich was
entitled to the protection of Section 7.3 against liability for "any action" with respect to "any
matter" if Mr. Rich acted in good faith and without actual malice." R. 1005. The district
court agreed that Mr. Rich did not act with malice or in bad faith. R. 1068. However, the
33

district court restricted the words "any action" and "any party" as only applying to HOA
members that bring an enforcement action, not those who are named as defendants in an
enforcement action. R. 1067. The court found Mr. Rich's reading of 7.3 was not sensible,
because under Mr. Rich's interpretation neither party is entitled to fees in an enforcement
action unless bad faith is shown. R. 1067. That is exactly how provision 7.3 reads. It is not
limited in any way other than bad faith and actual malice. Any ambiguity in the declaration
should be construed against the HOA as the drafter of the declaration and in favor of Mr.
Rich, The district court incorrectly limited the application of 7.3 and should therefore be
reversed on appeal
Mr. Rich objected to the attorney's fees requested by Plaintiffs because the affidavit
submitted by Plaintiffs did not comply with Rule 73 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (R.
1008-10), the fee of $161,659.66 was unreasonable (R. 1010), and the costs were
undocumentated and unsupported. R. 1011. The district court reduced the fees requested
by Plaintiffs in the amount of $25,950, but failed to provide the basis for reaching the
reduction. R. 1073-78. Instead, the district court merely reduced several fees or amounts by
an arbitrary number, without explaining why the reductions were made or why reductions
were not made for each entry. It is impossible to determine from the trial court decision how
the attorney fee award was reached.
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CONCLUSION
The Third District Court has taken the role as advocate in this case, rather than
objective fact finder and impartial reviewer of claims. The advocacy and enthusiasm of the
lower Court took the matter out of arbitration and increased the costs and time associated
with properly resolving the issues. Pursuant to the HO A declaration, the matter should have
been arbitrated, was arbitrated and the arbitration decision should be affirmed and this case
brought to an end.
Dated this / "^day of November, 2005
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & EOULSEN

myer'C. Snuffer, Jr.
ftorneys for Appellant/Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I served two true and correct copies of the foregoing
PETITIONER'S OPENING BRIEF ON APPEAL, via first class mail, postage prepaid,
on the following:
Erik A. Olsen
Thomas J. Burns
DURHAM, JONES & PJNEGAR
111 East Broadway, Suite 900
P.O. Box 4050
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-4050
on this

day of November, 2006.
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APPENDIX 1

SCOTT&
BABCOCK

A PROFESSIONAL
CORPORATION

505 EAST 200 SOUTH, SUITE
300
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH
84102
TELEPHONE (801) 531- 7000

FACSIMILE (80i) 531-7060
w w w BABCOCKSCOTT COM

ATTORNEYS AND
COUNSELORS A T LAW
ROBERT F BABCOCK
KENT B SCOTT
BRIAN J BABCOCK
JASON H ROBINSON
CODY W WILSON

k-PMT DR Q P n T T
'
• ° ^ ^ ' '
ATTORNEY AT LAW
EMAIL
KENT@BABCOCKSCOTT COM
rvCIN

September 21, 2005
VIA E-MAIL
P Christian Hague
TESCH LAW OFFICES
314 Main Street, Suite 210
Park City, Utah, 84060-3390
E-Mail chaque(g)teschlaw.com
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr.

NELSON SNUFFER DAHLE & POULSEN
10885 South State
Sandy, Utah 84070
E-mail dcsnuffer(5)aol.com
Re: Thayne Canyon Homeowners Association v John L. Rich

Counsel:
David Slaughter and Steve Gordon have appointed me to serve as the third member of
the arbitration panel and serve as the panel chair.
The panel members have conferred with one another and have asked me to conduct a
preliminary hearing conference this Friday at 2:00 p m. to discuss the pre-hearing and hearing
procedures and rules. Counsel for both parties and the arbitration panel will participate in the
conference Dave Slaughter has made the arrangements for you to call in and be joined in the
conference Dial 1-888-809-4018 and then the pass code of 431156. See Mr. Slaughter's
previous email.
At the pre-hearing conference please be prepared to discuss matters affecting (1) the
length of the arbitration hearing, (2) the exchange of witness and exhibit lists, (3) the
presentation of evidence through witnesses and exhibits, (4) any outstanding discovery and
motion matters, (5) the need for pre-hearing briefs, (6) the form of the award and (7) any other
matter affecting the hearing process.
EXHIBIT

The arbitrators have scheduled one day for the arbitration hearing commencing at 9:30
a.m. at Dave Slaughter's office on September 28, 2005. If the parties are not able to
accommodate this date, we will need to discuss re-scheduling this matter during our telephone
conference this Friday.

I would like counsel for the parties to confirm and acknowledge by signing this letter that
they have agreed to arbitrate all issues arising under Case No. 050500428 Ml pending in the
Third District Court for Summit County and assigned to Judge Bruce C. Lubek. In addition, I
would like counsel to acknowledge the appointment and accept the following arbitration panel to
arbitrate the issues in this case:
Kent B. Scott - Arbitration Panel Chair neutral appointed by Arbitrators Steve Gordon and
Dave Slaughter. Compensation rate: $220 per hour.
David Slaughter- Party appointed neutral appointed by John L. Rich
rate: $250 per hour with a minimum $2,500 per day guaranty.

Compensation

Steve Gordon - Party appointed neutral appointed by Thayne Canyon Homeowner's
Association. Compensation rate: $220 per hour.
Please contact me should you have any questions as to these matters. I will look forward
to Friday's pre-hearing conference and working with you on this matter.

Respectfully,

Kent B. Scott
Babcock Scott & Babcock

cc: David Slaughter [dslaughter@scmlaw.com]
cc: Steven Gordon. [SGordon@djplaw.com]

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT & CONFIRMATION
Counsel for the parties acknowledge and agree that the above referenced matter may be
arbitrated in accordance with the Utah Revised Uniform Arbitration Act and accept the
arbitration panel as on the terms and as provided for in this letter.

P. Christian Hague
Attorney for Thayne Canyon Homeowner's Association
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(Q&rtfetiV,. Snuffer
Attorneyftw John. L. Rich
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APPENDIX 2

VIA E-MAIL
Joseph E. Tesch
Christian Hague
TESCH LAWOFFICES
314 Main Street, Suite 210
Park City, Utah, 84060-3390
E-Mail joet@teschlaw.com
E-Mail chague(5)teschlaw com
Denver C Snuffer, Jr.
NELSON SNUFFER DAHLE & POULSEN
10885 South State
Sandy, Utah 84070
E-mail dcsnuffer(5)aol com
Re: Thayne Canyon Homeowners Association v John L,, %ich

Counsel
The panel is in receipt of Judge Lubeck's Order canceling the arbitration hearing in this
matter scheduled for September 28, 2005. Having conferred with the panel it is our decision
that Judge Lubek does not have the power to divest this panel of jurisdiction or cancel the
arbitration Jurisdiction and authority to cancehthe hearing is vested in the arbitration panel by
virtue of the Acknowledgment of the letter I sent to counsel dated September 21, 2005.
Based upon the foregoing, it is the decision of the panel to hold the arbitration hearing as
scheduled. The panel will entertain arguments on the jurisdiction issue prior to commencing the
evidentiary portion of'the hearing.

Respectfully,

Kent B. Scott
Babcock Scott & Babcock

cc:David Slaughter [dslaughter@scmlaw.com]
cc* Steven Gordon. [SGordon@djplaw com]

APPENDIX 3

IN ARBITRATION
In the Matter of the Arbitration between:
HTHAYNE'S CANYON HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION ETAL.
INTERIM AWARD
Claimants,
Arbitrators-

vs

Kent B Scott
IJOHN L RICH

David W Slaughter
Steven K Gordon

Respondent.

J_
INTRODUCTION
THE UNDERSIGNED ARBITRATORS (the "Panel") were properly appointed pursuant
to, and consistent with, paragraph 8.3 of the Declaration of Protective Covenants for the Thaynes
Canyon Subdivision (the "CC&Rs"), and pursuant to a written agreement of the parties dated
September 21, 2005 (the "Agreement' 1 ). Pursuant to the Agreement, the Panel conducted an
evidentiary hearing on September 28, 2005 in Salt Lake City, Utah Counsel for John L. Rich
appeared at the hearing. Despite having previously agreed to the hearing date, and despite
having notice of the hearing, counsel for Thayne's Canyon Homeowners' Association (the
"HOA") did not appear at, and expressly declined to participate in, the hearing. The Panel has
considered the evidence siid arguments of the parties, includmrr all wnt'en memoranda
documents and arguments submitted by counsel for the HOA despite his decision not to
participate m the hearing. After doing so, the Panel enters the following unanimous:
DECISION AND INTERIM AWARD
1.

By entering into the Agreement, the parties properly granted the arbitration panel

jurisdiction to arbitrate all claims arising under or relating to the case styled Thayne's Canyon
Homeowner's Association et al. vs. John L. Rich pending in the Third Distnct Court of Summit
County, State of Utah before the Hon Bruce C Lubek (Case No 050500428 Ml)

A

EXHIBIT
ORDER

ll

2

•14

2

2.

The HOA's Request for Cancellation of Arbitration is denied.

3.

The HOA's rejection of John L. Rich's request for a variance under paragraph 4.3

3

of the CC&Rs was unreasonable. Thus, Mr. Rich is entitled to a variance of paragraph 6.4 of the

4

CC&Rs. Pursuant to this variance, Mr. Rich should be allowed to proceed with the addition to

5

his home consistent with the current plans.

6

4.

This determination renders unnecessary any ruling on Mr. Rich's arguments that

7

the CC&Rs have been abandoned, in whole or in part, or that the HOA has selectively and

8

arbitrarily enforced provisions of the CC&Rs, including those governing set back requirements.

9

5.

Because Mr. Rich is the prevailing party, he is entitled to an award of attorneys'

10

fees and costs. Within ten days of the date of this award, counsel for Mr. Rich shall submit a

II

memorandum of attorneys' fees and costs incurred by Mr. Rich (the "Memorandum"), and the

12

appropriate supporting affidavit(s). Counsel for the HOA shall file a response within five days

13

of receipt of the Memorandum. Mr. Rich's counsel shall not file a reply unless requested by the

14

Panel.
6.

15

The parties shall pay the Panel fees as follows: David W. Slaughter and Steve K.

16

Gordon shall be paid by the party who appointed them. Each party shall pay one half of the kts

17

for KLent B. Scott, who was appointed as the third arbitrator by Mr. Slaughter and Mr. Gordon.
ARBITRATOR'S WRITTEN COMMENTS

18

The Panel provides the following comments on its own initiative to help the parties and

19
20

their counsel understand the reasons for this award. These comments are not findings of fact or

21

conclusions of law.
JURISDICTION

22

1.

23
24

By entering into the Agreement, the parties empowered the Panel to hear this

matter.

25
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z.
Subsequently, counsel for the HOA argued that the arbitration hearing was
ordered by, and thereafter cancelled by, the Court.

3.

Counsel for Mr. Rjch argued that although the Court initially ordered the

arbitration hearing, the parties subsequently consented to the arbitration hearing by signing the
Agreement, which states: "I would like counsel for the parties to confirm and acknowledge by
signing this letter that they have agreed to arbitrate all issues arising under Case No. 050500428
MI pending in the Third District Court for Summit County and assigned to Judge Baice C.
Lubek. In addition, I would like counsel to acknowledge the appointment and accept the
following arbitration to arbitrate the issues in this case...."
4.

The Panel and counsel participated in a preliminary scheduling conference on

September 23, 2005. James J. Kenny, an attorney and named party plaintiff, also participated in
the conference. Neither counsel for the HOA, nor Mr. Kenny, raised any objections to the PaneJ
or the hearing. Counsel for Mr. Rich stated that he had reservations concerning the jurisdiction
of the Court. However, he stated that he had no reservations about the Panel's jurisdiction or the
natter being arbitrated. Thus, he agreed to the arbitration hearing.
5.

At the preliminary scheduling conference, the Panel and counsel scheduled the

bitration hearing for September 28, 2005. The Panel and counsel also discussed pre-hearing
atters, including the parties' execution of the Agreement, the rules applicable to the arbitration
aring, motions, discovery, exchange of witness lists and exhibits, form of the award and preiring briefs. A Preliminary Scheduling Conference Order was entered and sent to counsel.
6.

Counsel for Mr. Rich executed the Agreement and added language expressly

rving Mr. Rich's challenges to the jurisdiction of the Court, but not the Panel.
7.

On the afternoon before the scheduled arbitration hearing, the Panel received from

resch a Request for Cancellation of Arbitration based upon the argument that Mr. Rich had
cted to the jurisdiction of the panel." This was not true. The Panel never received any
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objection to its jurisdiction from Mr. Rich or his counsel. Mr. Tesch did not request a hearing
on this issue.
8.

Before the Panel could consider Mr. Tesch's request or invite a hearing on the

issue, Mr. Tesch obtained an ex parte Order from the Court that: (a) set a show cause hearing
before the Court on October 5; and (b) purported to cancel the ltcourt-ordered arbitration.11 There
was no indication in the Court's order that the Court had been informed that the parties h<iu
signed the Agreement, which confers jurisdiction on the Panel independent, of any pnor court
order. Based on this development, late in the day on September 27, 2005, Mr. Tesch's legal
assistant informed the Panel that "the hearing has been cancelled.11 The Panel received the
Court's Order canceling the alteration hearing at approximately 5:00 p.m.
9.

The Panel 'then convened via telephone.

10.

The Panel determined that the arbitration hearing should proceed and that counsel

should be heard on the HOA's request that the Panel cancel the arbitration hearing, and on
related matters of the Panel's jurisdiction. The Panel emailed a letter to that effect to counsel,
and attempted to contact both counsel by telephone.
11.

On September 28, 2005, counsel for Mr. Rich was present with a witness.

Counsel for the HOA did not appear. The Panel telephoned Mr. Tesch, who: (a) refused to
discuss the matter with the Panel; (b) stated that he would not participate in the arbitration
hearing; and (c) stated that he would state in position in writing. Counsel for Mr. Rich reiterated
that he was not objecting to the jurisdiction of the Panel and requested the arbitration hearing
proceed.
12.

Subsequently, the Panel received a letter from counsel for the HOA in which he

stated that: (a) he considered the arbitration to be Court-ordered, and (b) the Panel had no
authority to act independent of the Court.
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13.

Because of the Court's order canceling the hearing, the Panel was concerned

about proceeding with arbitration hearing. The Panel did not want to convey any disrespect to
the Court. However, after deliberating, the Panel unanimously determined that although the
arbitration was initially ordered by the Court, it ceased to be Court-ordered when the parties
executed the Agreement, in which they consented in writing to the arbitration of all issues in the
underlying case, consented to use the arbitrators that had been appointed, and participated in a
preliminary scheduling conference relating to the governance of the arbitration process. There
never was an objection to the arbitration hearing or to the Panel. In fact, both parties noted .
technical objections to arbitration, even as ordered by the Court, but waived those objections in
favor of the arbitration, and confirmed that agreement in writing.
14.

In sum the arbitration hearing proceeded not pursuant to the Court's order, but

rather pursuant to the Agreement (consistent with paragraph 8.3 of the CC&Rs), which granted
jurisdiction to the Panel independent of any court order.

The parties also participated in a

oreliminary hearing that resulted in the governance of the arbitration process.
15.

Based on the foregoing, the Panel determines and concludes that jurisdiction of

le dispute between the parties passed by written agreement to the Panel when the parties
Dnsented to the arbitration in signing the Agreement and participated in the preliminary
heduling conference.
16.

This Interim Award is not intended to affect the Court's Temporary Restraining

der, Order to Show Cause or any other matters in this case. The scope of the Panel's
sdiction is limited to the issues submitted under the Agreement, which have been decided
z'm.
CONCLUSION
The Panel confirms that this Intenm Award is a complete disposition of all the issues
litted to them under the CC&Rs, the Court's Temporary Restraining Order dated September

ORDER - 5

16, 2005, the Agreement, and the evidence and legal arguments which were presented in
connection with the arbitration hearing held in Salt Lake City, Utah on September 28, 2005.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

1 hereby certify that on this <p J

day of September, 2005, a true and correct copy of the foregoing

ent was served by the method indicated below, to the following
Joseph E Tesch
P Christian Hague
Paul R Poulsen
TESCH LAW OFFICES, P C
314 Main Street, Suite 201
P O Box 3390
Park City, Utah 84060-3390
Facsimile (435)649-2561

Certified Mail,
D Hand Delivered
D Overnight Mail
^Facsimile

Denver Snuffer
NELSON, SNUFFER
10885 South State Street
Sandy, UT 84070
Facsimile (801)576-1960

yV S Cemfied Mail
D Hand Delivered
o Overnight Mail
^Facsimile

ORDER 7

1

!

APPENDIX 4

SALT LAKE CITY

UTAH

8-4102

tnfr SCOTT &

TELEPHONE (SO I ) 5 3 I - 7COO

Hill BABCOCK

WWW BABCOCKSCOTT COM

FACSIMILE (SO 1 ) 5 3 1 - 7 0 6 0

A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
ROBERTF

BABCOCK

KENT B SCOTT
BRIAN J BABCOCK

KENT B

JASON H ROBINSON

SCOTT

ATTORNEY AT LAW

CODY W WILSON

EMAIL KEKT@BABCOCKSCOTT COM

October 12, 2005
VIA U. S. MAIL & E-MAIL
Joseph E. Tesch
Christian Hague
TESCH LAW OFFICES
314 Main Street, Suite 210
Park City, Utah, 84060-3390
E-Mail joet@teschlaw.com
E-Mail chague@teschlaw.com

Re: Thayne Canyon Homeowners Association v John L. Rich
Third District Court, Summit County - Case 050500428 Ml

Counsel:
The panel acknowledges receipt of your letter forwarding a copy of Judge Lubeck's ruling
and order in the parties' litigation. We have also received a copy of your later letter regarding
Respondent's Motion and Affidavit for Attorneys' Fees.
With all due respect to Judge Lubeck's conclusions concerning the panel's understanding
2nd beliefs going forward, it remains our unanimous position that the arbitration was conducted
in accordance with controlling authority. The decision to proceed was carefully considered and
only after affording both you and Mr. Snuffer the opportunity to address your motion to cancel
the arbitration. As Mr. Tesch will recall, he flatly refused to do so, challenging the "jurisdiction"
of the panel, despite the confirmed agreement to submit to the panel the issues outlined. We
considered nonetheless your letter explaining your position and detennined that it was contrary
to the collective interests of the parties to further postpone the matter.
While we appreciate that Mr. Tesch, personally, did not participate in the scheduling
hearing that led to the agreement signed by counsel for both sides, the reason the panel
required that signed agreement was to prevent either party from relying ultimately on issues of
waiver or jurisdiction to challenge the ultimate arbitration award. Each side (Mr. Hague for
yours) confirmed to the panel its separate agreement to arbitrate, specifically waiving any and
all objections each disclosed as having raised with the Court. It was on that basis alone that we

• p r to josepn t i escn,
Bfenesday, October 12, 2005

page 2 of 2

In Mr. Tesch's letter of October 12, 2005, he requested the panel to inform the parties as
to their intent to proceed to rule on the award of attorneys fees to Respondent as the prevailing
party in this matter. We have not been served with Respondent's Affidavit of Attorneys' Fees.
However, in light of the Court's order vacating the Interim Award the matter of attorneys' fees
under that aVvard is rendered moot. Under § 78-31 a-129 of the Revised Utah Uniform
Arbitration Act the parties may appeal Judge Lubeck's Order. However, the Panel intends to
take no further action in the arbitration until it is directed otherwise.

Respectfully,
^

/Kent B. Scott, Panel Chair
Babcock Scott & Babcock

cc: Hon. Bruce C. Lubeck via facsimile (435) 336-3030
cc:vT)enver C. Snuffer, Jr. [dcsnuff@aol.com]
cc: David Slaughter [dslaughter@scmlaw.com]
cc: Steven Gordon. [SGordon@djplaw.com]

^
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MICHAEL W, DECARLO
ARCHITECT
8 0 1 - 5 1 8 - 6 5 0 1 CELL

AUGUST 26, 2 0 0 5

MR. J A M E S KENNY
58 T H A Y N E S C A N Y O N DRIVE
PARK CITY, UTAH

84060

RE' PERMITTED ADDITION TO 57 T H A Y N E S C A N Y O N DRIVE
DEAR M R . KENNY,
P U R S U A N T TO YOUR LETTER, J O H N RICH W O U L D LIKE THIS MATTER T O BE RESOLVED UNDER
A R B I T R A T I O N O F DISPUTES' CLAUSE I N T H E C C R S .
MR. R I C H IS ASKING FOR THIS HEARING BY AN ARBITRATOR DUE TO T H E FOLLOWING
REASONS;
T H E CITY HAS GRANTED A BUILDING PERMIT FOR THIS PARTICULAR REMODELING
PROJECT, A L L FEZS HAVE BEEN PAID A N D WORK HAS BEGUN,
I HAVE TAKEN REASONABLE EFFORTS I N STEPPING THE FOUNDATION (TWICE),
LIMITING THE POTENTIAL ENCROACHMENT, T H E ACTUAL ENCROACHMENT IS LESS
THAN 1 0 % (1 1 SQUARE FEET) O F T H E ALLOWABLE ENCROACHMENT ALLOWED BY
PARK CITY'S REQUIREMENTS.
T H I S WILL BE PRESENTED AS A ' H A R D S H I P C A S E ' DUE TO T H E NON-PARALLEL
PROPERTY LINES, T H E CONVERGING PROPERTY U N E S PROVIDE A VERY LIMIT AREA TO
BUILD THIS MODEST ADDITION,
MR. KENNY, WE HAVE VERBALLY PRESENTED OUR CASE T O YOU, MR, S I U A R T A N D MR. PIPER
A N D THERE HAS BEEN VERY LITTLE UNDERSTANDING OP T H E HARDSHIP A N D REASONABLE
EFFORTS TAKEN IN THE DESIGN T O MINIMIZE T H E ENCROACHMENT W E HAVE NOT BEEN

ALLOWED TO PRESENT OUR CASE IN FRONT OF THE ARCHITECTURAL COMMITTEE AND WE
HAVE NOT SEEN THE MINUTES OF THE MEETING WHERE OUR CASE WAS HEARD.
M R S . STUART, T H E NEIGHBOR T O T H E N O R T H O F THIS PROPERTY WAS SOLICITED BY
MR. S T U A R T I N FRONT O F ME A B O U T HER THOUGHTS O N OUR PLANED ADDITION.
M R S . STUART'S RESPONSE WAS " J U S T L E T THEM D O WHAT THEY W A N T TO D O " IN ADDITION,
THERE I S N O 'ARCHITECTURAL GUIDE 1 THAT IS REFERENCED IN THE

CCRfs THAT

A HOME

OWNER CAN USE WHEN CONSIDERING AN ADDITION,
WE ARE ASKING THE HOA TO STEP ASIDE AND SUGGEST AN ARBITRATOR TO HEAR THIS
MATTER AND REMOVE THE EMOTION OUT OF THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS. WE FEEL OUR
REQUEST AND PROPOSED ADDITION IS REASONABLE AS ALLOWED IN THE CCRS.

rxaoz
MICHAEL DECARLO
A R C H I T E C T FOR MR. J O H N RICH

